Within a single address-space, the capability-security properties of actor references are guaranteed by the actor run-time. Memory-safe implementations of actor languages ensure that actor references cannot be forged. Having a reference to an actor means you have permission to send it a message. A single machine may host multiple independent actor address-spaces, each of which […]
16
Feb
2017
Distributed Security
Tags: actor, authentication, authorization, capability, decryption, distribution, encryption, envelope, network, ocaps, POLA, proxy, receptionist, routing, sealer, stub, unsealer
09
Oct
2013
Towards a Universal Implementation of Unforgeable Actor Addresses
Tags: actor, capability, decryption, encryption, grant-matcher, ocaps, POLA, sealer, Slominski, trust, unsealer
[It is my pleasure to welcome my colleague and collaborator, Tristan Slominski, as a guest-blogger -Dale] 2017-02-07 EDIT: A previous version of this article used the term Domain instead of Realm. In the popular implementations of the Actor Model, actor addresses are usually globally available to any other actor desiring to discover them. However, in […]